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Abstract
  The  paper  challenges  a  recent  attempt  by  Jouni-Matti  Kuukkanen  to  show  that  since  Thomas  Kuhn’s  
philosophical standpoint can be incorporated into coherentist epistemology, it does not necessarily lead to: (Thesis 
1) an abandonment of rationality and rational interparadigm theory comparison, nor to (Thesis 2) an abandonment 
of convergent realism. Leaving aside the interpretation of Kuhn as a coherentist, we will show that Kuukkanen’s  
first thesis is not sufficiently explicated, while the second one entirely fails. With regard to Thesis 1, we argue that  
Kuhn’s view on inter-paradigm theory comparison allows only for (what we shall dub as) “the weak notion of  
rationality”, and that Kuukkanen’s argument is thus acceptable only in view of such a notion. With regard to  
Thesis 2, we show that even if we interpret Kuhn as a coherentist, his philosophical standpoint cannot be seen as  
compatible with convergent realism since Kuhn’s argument against it is not “ultimately empirical”, as Kuukkanen  
takes it to be.
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1. Introduction
In  his  recent  paper,  Jouni-Matti  Kuukkanen  argues  that  Thomas  Kuhn’s  philosophical 
standpoint does not necessarily lead to: 
a) an abandonment of rationality and rational inter-paradigm theory comparison, nor to
b) an abandonment of scientific realism and the convergence thesis (p. 555). 
(Kuukkanen, 2007, p. 555).
The reason why these two conclusions can be avoided lies, according to Kuukkanen, in the fact 
that Kuhn’s ideas can be interpreted in terms of a coherentist epistemology. More precisely, he 
argues that a coherentist approach to theory evaluation provides the criteria for a rational inter-
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paradigm theory comparison (Thesis 1) and is compatible with convergent realism (Thesis 2). 
The aim of this paper is to discuss Kuukkanen’s arguments used for rejecting a) and b). We do 
not wish to criticize his interpretation of Kuhn as a coherentist, but to show that his theses, built 
on the basis of this interpretation, are either insufficiently explicated (Thesis 1), or should be 
entirely rejected (Thesis 2).
With respect to the first point, we will argue that Kuukkanen’s notion of rationality, which 
he  uses  to  characterize  Kuhnian  inter-paradigm  theory  comparison, needs  to  be  further 
elaborated. We will show that Kuhn’s ideas on theory choice allow only for (what we shall dub 
as)  “the  weak  notion  of  rationality”, which  is, in  fact, compatible  with  coherentist 
epistemology, but which might not be acceptable for some philosophers of science. We will 
conclude that, if Kuukkanen’s aim is to interpret Kuhn in terms of some stronger notion of 
rationality, he is on the wrong track. If, on the other hand, his  notion of rationality is  the 
weaker  one, introducing  coherentist  epistemology  does  not  bring  any  novel  insights  into 
Kuhnian  inter-paradigm theory  comparison, since  such a  notion  of  rationality  was  already 
explicated by Kuhn himself.
With respect to the second point, we will show that convergent realism cannot be seen as 
compatible with Kuhn’s philosophical standpoint even if we agree that it can be compatible 
with coherentist epistemology. We will argue that Kuhn’s argument against convergent realism 
is  not “ultimately empirical”, as Kuukkanen takes it  to be, and thus, cannot be refuted on 
empirical grounds.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present a brief summary of Kuukkanen’s 
arguments. In  Section 3 we  discuss  the  issue  of  inter-paradigm theory  comparison, while 
Section 4 elaborates the problem of convergent realism. Section 5 brings some concluding 
remarks.
2. Kuukkanen on Kuhn
Kuukkanen characterizes Kuhn’s work as compatible with coherentist epistemology on the 
basis  of  what  he calls “Kuhn’s  epistemological  conservatism” and the  idea that  science is 
fundamentally problem-solving1 (ibid., p. 559). Let us have a brief look at each of these points.
First, Kuukkanen argues that the historical perspective underlying Kuhn’s approach represents 
an  epistemological  framework  according  to  which  knowledge  is  evaluated  against  a 
background of accepted beliefs characteristic  of a specific scientific paradigm. Further, what 
needs to be evaluated is not beliefs as such, but the desirability of a particular change of belief. 
Maintaining that Kuhn adopted a piecemeal approach to theory change in which “it is rational 
to attempt to improve the justification of the old system, rather than to reject the whole system 
and  try  to  construct  an  alternative  one”,  Kuukkanen  characterizes  Kuhn’s  position  as 
1 Since Kuukkanen uses “puzzle solving” and “problem solving” interchangeably, we do the same. For Kuhn’s 
remark on the difference between the two (i.e. between Popperian “problem solving” and his own “puzzle 
solving”) see Kuhn (1970), p. 4-5.
“epistemological conservatism” (p. 558).
The second relevant feature of Kuhn’s views is that scientific practice is essentially puzzle-
solving, and that “the choice between two theories turns, therefore, to the question of whether 
the  suggested  alternative  manages  to  solve  the  puzzle  that  the  older  theory  could  not, or 
whether it can solve more puzzles than the old one” (Ibid., p. 558-559). 
In view of these two theses Kuukkanen argues that Kuhn’s standpoint can be incorporated into 
coherentist  epistemology. He  primarily  calls  upon  L. Bonjour’s  theory  of  coherence, 
summarizing Bonjour’s approach in the following three criteria: consistency of the system, the 
degree  of  inferential  connections  it  contains, and  the  number  of  unexplained  anomalous 
instances it exhibits (ibid., p. 560). According to Kuukkanen, the first point of his interpretation 
of Kuhn – epistemological conservatism – fits the coherentist idea that the system should not 
be changed if that results in a decrease of its coherence, and the other way around: if coherence 
can be increased, the system ought to be changed. The second point – puzzle (or problem) 
solving – is characterized as a natural component of coherentist epistemology: “Problems, that 
is, phenomena unexplained by the machinery of the set, decrease the number and strength of 
inferential relations between the components of the set, making the system less coherent.” (p. 
561). In other words, problem solving can be described as coherence-increasing activity.
Although Kuukkanen remarks that Kuhn himself might not have agreed with the description 
of himself as a coherentist, he points out that there are indications in Kuhn’s work that actually 
go in the direction of coherentism. In this paper we are not going to discuss whether such an 
interpretation is valid. Kuukkanen himself mentions a number of obstacles for incorporating 
Kuhn  into  coherentist  epistemology. What  we  are  interested  in  is  the  following  question: 
provided we agree with the interpretation of Kuhn as a coherentist, are Kuukkanen’s points 
regarding Kuhn’s view on the rationality of inter-paradigm theory comparison and convergent 
realism acceptable?  The following two sections are devoted to these issues.
3. Inter-paradigm theory comparison and theory choice
The first thesis that Kuukkanen argues for is that Kuhn’s philosophy does not necessarily 
lead  to  an  abandonment  of  rational  inter-paradigm  theory  comparison, since  it  can  be 
incorporated into coherentist epistemology. However, he makes no remarks on the notion of 
rationality  that is  employed  here.  In  this  section  we  present  three  possible  concepts  of 
rationality with respect to the determination of theory choice. Next, we discuss which of the 
three can be taken to describe Kuhn’s own approach to theory choice. Finally, we explicate the 
notion of rationality Kuukkanen needs to accept when arguing that Kuhn’s standpoint can be 
incorporated into coherentist epistemology.
Let us begin by distinguishing two concepts of rationality governing theory choice, with 
respect to the relation between the criteria of theory choice and the determination of choice. In 
order to speak at all of a theory choice being rational, we presuppose that the criteria used in 
this process are, generally speaking, shared by the scientific community,  that is, scientists in 
general agree that arguing according to these standards is rational. 
1. Strong notion of rationality: the choice of a theory is strictly determined by 
the criteria shared by the scientific community. That is, an application of the criteria leads 
to a unique theory choice. 
2. Weak notion of rationality: the choice of a theory is not strictly determined 
by the shared criteria. That is, the criteria do not provide a linear preference order on the set 
of theories in question. With respect to the way the criteria are applied, we can make a 
further distinction between: 
a)  Moderately weak notion of rationality: although the preference 
order on the criteria, as well as the rules of their application, is fixed, a linear order on 
theories is not guaranteed: the given criteria together with the rules of their application 
might be insufficient for deciding between two theories. 
b)  Very  weak  notion  of  rationality:  even  though the  criteria  are 
shared, the rules of their application as well as the preference order on them are not a priori  
fixed,  but  are  dependent  on  the  particular  context  and/or  the  background  knowledge, 
beliefs, values, etc. of an individual scientist. 
Let us now move to Kuhn’s views on inter-paradigm theory comparison and theory choice. 
First of all, Kuhn insisted that the theory comparison is done in view of a set of shared criteria 
(fsee, or example, Kuhn, 1977, p. 322; 2000, p. 96). However,
There is no neutral algorithm for theory-choice, no systematic decision procedure 
which, properly applied, must lead each individual in the group to the same decision. 
(Kuhn, 2000, p. 200)
Hence, our strong notion of rationality does not fit Kuhn’s views. Moreover: 
Individually the criteria are imprecise: individuals may legitimately differ about their 
application to concrete cases. In addition, when deployed together, they repeatedly 
prove to conflict with one another: accuracy may, for example, dictate the choice of 
one theory, scope the choice of its competitor. (Kuhn 1977, p. 322)
... for purposes of evaluation, one must embed it [a newly proposed law or theory] in 
a relevant body of currently accepted beliefs — for example, those governing the 
instruments with which the relevant observations have been made — and then apply 
to the whole a set of secondary criteria. Accuracy is one of these, consistency with 
other accepted beliefs is another, breadth of applicability a third, simplicity a fourth, 
and there are others besides. All these criteria are equivocal, and they are rarely all 
satisfied  at  once. Accuracy  is  ordinarily  approximate, and  often  unavailable. 
Consistency is at best local ... Simplicity is in the eye of the beholder. And so on.  
(Kuhn, 2000, p. 114)
Even with respect to puzzle-solving (which Kuukkanen, as we have seen, takes to be 
Kuhn’s key criterion of theory choice) Kuhn writes: “Like any other value, puzzle-solving 
ability  proves  equivocal  in  application.” (Kuhn, 1996, p. 205). It  follows  that  our 
moderately weak notion of rationality does not capture Kuhn’s standpoint either. We are 
thus left with the very weak notion of rationality.
So, for Kuhn there are indeed shared standards governing theory choice, but they alone 
are not sufficient for explaining it: 
One can explain, as the historian characteristically does, why particular men made 
particular choices at particular times. But for that purpose one must go beyond the 
list of shared criteria to characteristics of the individuals who make the choice. (Kuhn 
1977, p. 324)
These other criteria can be seen as reasons  why the shared standards are applied in different 
ways. Their different application can be explained by different preference orders on the shared 
criteria,  different  ways  of  evaluating  the  same  (shared)  criterion,  or  different  parts  of  a 
theoretical framework to which the same (shared) criterion is applied (see ibid., p. 334). Thus, 
instead of an algorithmic path, discussions among scientists often take the path of persuasion:
... the superiority of one theory to another is something that cannot be proved in the 
debate. Instead, I have insisted, each party must try, by persuasion, to convert the 
other ... Debates over theory-choice cannot be cast in a form that fully resembles 
logical or mathematical proof. (Kuhn, 1996, p. 198-199) 
Kuhn explains that this does not mean that there are no good reasons for being persuaded, or 
that  these  reasons  are  not  ultimately  decisive  for  the  group  of  scientists  involved  in  the 
discussion, or  that  they  are  different  from the  standard  criteria  of  theory  choice, such  as 
accuracy, simplicity, etc. (see also Kuhn 1970, p. 238, 241, 260-262). His point is that the 
reasons used for persuasion “function as values” (Kuhn, 1996, p. 199): just  as values can be 
differently applied and used to argue in favour of different positions, so can otherwise shared 
criteria be used to argue in favour of different theories.
Now, if we take into account these arguments, then the only way to incorporate Kuhn’s 
standpoint into coherentist epistemology is by accepting that: 
1.  the  criteria  of  coherence  evaluation  do  not  represent  an  algorithm  that,  if  properly 
applied, leads each evaluator to the same result; 
2. the way in which the coherentist criteria are applied (for example, their preference order, 
the scope of their application, etc.) can vary, and is in this way context dependent. 
Interestingly enough, such a weak notion of rationality is not incompatible with coherentist 
accounts themselves. Neither Bonjour nor Thagard offers a preference order on the criteria of 
coherence evaluation or a strict way in which these criteria are to be applied. On the contrary, 
both conceptions imply a contextual approach to coherence evaluation. In the case of Bonjour, 
his Doxastic Presumption, as well  as his Observation Requirement,  directly implys context 
dependency of coherence evaluation (see Bonjour, 1985, especially p. 119, 283). In the case of 
Thagard’s account, its contextual character is equally obvious: with regards to the comparative 
coherence evaluation of phlogiston and oxygen theories, Thagard explicitly points out that his 
model 
is biased towards the oxygen theory, since it was based on the analysis of Lavoisier’s 
argument. [... It] is not intended to represent the point of view of a phlogiston theorist, a 
neutral observer, or the entire scientific community (Thagard, 1992, p. 85, 88).
Let us now return to Kuukkanen’s interpretation of Kuhn. With regards to Kuhn’s point that 
the criteria of theory choice might be differently applied, he writes: 
Yet, this  does  not  make theory  choice arbitrary  or  irrational. The shared  values, 
however differently shaped, seem to lead to the same theory choice by community 
members, as ‘most members of the group will ultimately find one set of arguments 
than another decisive’ (Kuhn, 1996, p. 200). (Kuukkanen, 2007, p. 559; the reference 
to Kuhn adapted to our list of references) 
This remark does not help in clarifying what Kuukkanen understands by “rational”. On the one 
hand, he is aware of Kuhn’s point that the criteria of theory evaluation might be differently 
applied. On the other hand, he omits to mention that the reason why community members tend 
to make the same choices is not explained by the shared criteria alone. The explanation of their 
unique choice, according to Kuhn, lies in the process of persuasion that enables the majority to 
accept specific application of the standards governing theory evaluation.2 Which notion of 
rationality Kuukkanen uses here depends on the way in which the link between the criteria and 
the theory choice is understood. If his point that shared values “lead to the same theory choice” 
is supposed to mean that the shared criteria always determine the same result in spite of their 
different application, Kuhn is being interpreted in the sense of our strong notion of rationality. 
Moreover, Kuukkanen writes: 
I  show that  problem-solving can be unproblematically connected to  a coherentist 
epistemology. What is more, there are indications in Kuhn’s writings that he might 
have accepted this conclusion. Surprisingly, this means that Kuhn implicitly agreed 
that there could be a rational inter-paradigm theory comparison. (ibid., p. 556; italics 
added). 
Again, this passage could be understood as suggesting that the idea of rational inter-paradigm 
theory comparison is not at all obviously or explicitly present in Kuhn’s writings. Since, as we 
have shown, the “very weak notion of rationality” is indeed elaborated by Kuhn,3 it could be 
2 This is clear already from the context in which the part of the sentence quoted by Kuukkanen appears. Let us 
have a look at the entire sentence: “What one must understand, however, is the manner in which a particular 
set of shared values interacts with the particular experiences shared by the community of specialists to ensure 
that most members of the group will ultimately find one set of arguments rather than another decisive. That 
process is persuasion [...]” (Kuhn, 1996, p. 200).
3 We do not wish to argue that Kuhn gave an elaborated theory of rationality governing theory choice, but only 
that his repeated explication of this problem accords with the very weak notion of rationality defined in this 
paper.
assumed that Kuukkanen’s aim is to interpret Kuhn’s standpoint in terms of some stronger 
notion of rationality. In case this really is Kuukkanen’s intention, his interpretation is on the 
wrong track.
If, on the other hand, Kuukkanen uses the term rational in the sense of our notion of very 
weak  rationality, his analysis faces a different sort of criticism. First of all, such an idea of 
rationality might not seem all that  rational to some philosophers of science, in particular to 
those for whom Kuhn's conception of rationality is too weak, that is, to those who, contrary to 
Kuukkanen, think that Kuhn should not be seen as a rationalist because of his weak notion of 
rationality (ibid., p. 562). Second, and more importantly, it could be asked, why the recourse to 
coherentism is  needed  at  all  if  Kuhnian  inter-paradigm theory  comparison can  already be 
shown to be  rational  (in  the  sense of  our  very weak notion)  on the basis  of  Kuhn’s  own 
writings.  If  Kuhn  already  explicated  his  view  on  theory  choice,  what  is  the  benefit  of 
incorporating him into coherentist epistemology, with respect to this question?  Such a benefit 
cannot be found in interpreting Kuhn in terms of some stronger notion of rationality, for such 
an approach would be inconsistent with Kuhn’s own standpoint, as it has been shown in this 
section. But if we are left with the very weak notion, then coherentism does not offer anything 
new  with  respect  to  the  issue  discussed,  and  is  thus  unexplanatory.  Moreover,  linking 
coherentist epistemology with Kuhn is not at all straight forward, since, for example, Kuhn 
maintained  that  the  development  of  science(s)  leads  to  an  increased  incoherence  among 
scientific  disciplines,  as  Kuukkanen  himself  remarks  (cp.  Kuhn,  2000,  p.  98-99  and 
Kuukkanen, 2007, p. 564).
It is important to notice that, speaking  in principle, there would be a third option left for 
Kuukkanen: namely, to show that even though Kuhn's conception of rationality is a weak one, 
it is not necessarily implied from “the core” of his views. In this case, Kuukkanen's aim would 
be to link some stronger notion of rationality with a part of Kuhn's views. Nevertheless, he 
explicitly  states  that  he  takes  Kuhn's  philosophy  as a whole to  be at  least  consistent  with 
coherentist epistemology:
I  will  show  below  in  detail  that Kuhn's  philosophy indeed  fits  with  a  coherentist 
epistemology. (Kuukkanen 2007, p. 558; italics added)
... I believe this extension of his philosophy does not distort his thinking. (p. 559)
Now  we  come  to  the  crucial  part. We  have  to  assess  how  epistemological 
coherentism  meshes  with Kuhn's  characterization  of  science  as  a  whole, and 
specifically, how it agrees with the criteria that he suggests are used in theory choice. 
(p. 560; italics added)
... all criteria are linked either directly or indirectly via problem-solving to coherence, 
which makes Kuhn's philosophy consistently coherentist. (p. 561; italics added)
These  passages  clearly  show that  the  notion  of  rationality  used  by  Kuukkanen  is  not 
supposed to oppose of Kuhn's views taken  as a whole, and therefore should not oppose 
Kuhn's views on the rationality underlying theory choice either.
Thus, we can conclude that Kuukkanen’s argument from coherentism to the rationality of 
Kuhnian inter-paradigm theory comparison is either invalid or unexplanatory.
4. Convergent realism and correspondence theory of truth
Having  argued  that  Kuhn’s  position  can  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  a  coherentist 
epistemology, Kuukkanen goes on to argue that, since convergent realism is compatible with 
coherentism, it is therefore compatible with Kuhn’s views as well.4 Kuukkanen agrees that the 
link  from  coherentism  to  realism  isn’t  straight  forward, but  if  we  can  show  continuity, 
increasing coherence and stability over the long run in the history of science, “an argument for 
the (approximate)  truth of  theories  has  some intuitive  appeal” (Kuukkanen,  2007,  p.  564). 
According to him, Kuhn’s rejection of convergent realism is empirically motivated: 
Although Kuhn had some reservations with the regard to the notion of truth-likeness, 
he assigned to empirical historical research a central role in deciding the issue of 
convergence.
And a bit further on: 
Although  Kuhn  argued  that  the  history  of  science  does  not  yield  support  for 
convergent realism (and for an overall increase of coherence in science), convergent 
realism  is  not  incompatible  with  his  philosophy  because  Kuhn’s  argument  is 
ultimately empirical. (p. 565) 
Let us begin by noting that, in view of the above mentioned quote from Kuukkanen, what he 
actually  claims  is  the  following: had  Kuhn found sufficient  empirically  based  support  for 
convergent realism, he would have agreed with it (or at least, such an agreement would be 
consistent with his own philosophical position). Consequently, if further research reveals some 
good empirically based arguments for realism, that will be sufficient to refute Kuhn’s sceptical 
view on it.
In  addition, in  order  to  claim the  compatibility  between  Kuhn’s  views  and  convergent 
realism, Kuukkanen first had to reassure us that Kuhn’s position is compatible with one of the 
most crucial constituents of convergent realism: the correspondence theory of truth. Thus, at 
the beginning of his article he argues that Kuhn did not successfully reject the correspondence 
theory  of  truth.  According  to  Kuukkanen,  Kuhn  only  showed  that  there  is  no  direct  and 
unproblematic access to truth, but that did not refute the correspondence theory itself: 
Even if we could not assess a match between a theory and reality, it [Kuhn’s attack] 
does  not  make  the  idea  that  truth  consists  in  a  relationship  of  correspondence 
4 Even though Kuukkanen does not offer an explicit definition of convergent realism, it is clear that he refers to 
a view according to which scientific theories can be seen as converging towards the truth in the sense of the 
correspondence theory of truth (cp. “[...] the realist typically understands truth as correspondence with reality” 
(p. 562) and the rest of Section 4 in Kuukkanen, 2007).
between an independent world and our beliefs, theories, and so on, meaningless. In 
other words, the correspondence theory is a theory that offers an interpretation of 
what truth is without any epistemic concern as to whether we can know the truth. 
(ibid., p. 556; italics added)
By making this point, Kuukkanen is able to argue in the following way: Kuhn never refuted the 
correspondence theory itself, so his theory is compatible with it, as well as with convergent 
realism; if historical arguments show stability, continuity and increasing coherence of scientific 
theories, it is plausible to accept a convergent realist standpoint, which is thus not necessarily 
incompatible with Kuhn’s approach.
The main problem with this line of reasoning is that, according to Kuhn’s central ideas, a 
valid empirically based argument for convergent realism is, principally speaking, not possible. 
In what follows we will first show that Kuhn himself thought of his argument to be an a priori 
one. Second, we  will  present  this  argument  as  Kuhn’s  rejection  of  the  very  condition  of 
possibility of the convergent realist view – the correspondence theory of truth.
Let us begin with the first point. Although Kuhn referred to a historical meta-induction, he 
pointed out that his argument does not rely on it: 
...  my  generation  of  philosophers/historians  saw  ourselves  as  building  a 
philosophy on observations of actual  scientific behavior. Looking back now, I 
think that the image of what we were up to is misleading. Given what I shall call 
the historical perspective, one can reach many of the central conclusions we drew 
with scarcely a glance at the historical record itself. ... And it is taking longer still  
to  realize  that,  with  that  perspective  achieved,  many  of  the  most  central 
conclusions we drew from the historical record can be derived instead from first  
principles. Approaching them in that way reduces their apparent contingency ... . 
(Kuhn, 2000, p. 111-112; italics added)
Taking the context into account, it is clear that by first principles Kuhn means the principles 
that constitute scientific practice as such. A rejection of convergent realism could thus rely on 
what we can conclude from the nature of science, i.e. on its key constituents, without which it 
would be difficult to conceive science in the sense of the term as we know it.  But was such an 
approach undertaken by Kuhn?  By presenting his “tripartite conviction” Kuhn answered this 
question: 
First, the Archimedean platform outside of history, outside of time and space, is gone 
beyond recall. Second, in its absence, comparative evaluation is all there is. ... And 
third, if the notion of truth has a role to play in scientific development, which I shall 
elsewhere argue that it does, then truth cannot be anything like correspondence to 
reality.  ...  I’ve  reached  that  position  from  principles  that  must  govern  all 
developmental processes, without, that is, needing to call upon actual examples of 
scientific behavior. (ibid., p. 115)5 
Furthermore, the  objections  on his  reference to  history  and sociology of  science  were  not 
unknown  to  Kuhn  and  he  opposed  them  by  emphasizing  that “the  generalizations  which 
constitute received theories in sociology and psychology (and history?)  are weak reeds from 
which to weave a philosophy of science” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 235).
The crucial part of Kuhn’s a priori reasoning against convergent realism is his argument 
against the correspondence theory of truth. Let us recall that, according to Kuukkanen, the 
correspondence  theory  can  be  seen  as  compatible  with  Kuhn’s  account  since  Kuhn never 
succeeded at rejecting the theory itself. We argue that Kuukkanen does not take into account 
that  Kuhn’s  attack  on  the  correspondence theory  of  truth  is  an  attack  on  one of  its  main 
constitutive ideas – the notion of the mind-independent world. We shall present a number of 
places from Kuhn’s work that substantiate our point. We begin with his explicit rejection of the 
possibility of truth as the correspondence to “the one big mind-independent world”, and move 
towards arguments given in the framework of his so-called “Post-Darwinian Kantianism”. 
... truth cannot be anything like correspondence to reality. I am not suggesting, let me 
emphasize, that there is a reality which science fails to get at. My point is rather that  
no  sense  can be  made of  the  notion  of  reality  as  it  has  ordinarily  functioned in 
philosophy of science. (Kuhn, 2000, p. 115)
Kuhn, thus, argues not only that the match between the mind and from it independent reality is 
not assessable, but that this match is nonsensical. 
But the natural sciences, dealing objectively with the real world (as they do), are 
generally held to be immune. Their truths (and falsities) are thought to transcend the 
ravages of temporal, cultural, and linguistic change. I am suggesting, of course, that 
they cannot do so. Neither the descriptive nor the theoretical language of natural 
science provides the bedrock such transcendence would require. (ibid., p. 75) 
The reasons for these claims need to be explicated in view of Kuhn’s discussion of the notion 
of world. First of all, Kuhn emphasizes the world-constitutive role of intentionality and mental 
representations (p. 103), of a lexicon that is always already in place (p. 86): 
…  different  languages  impose  different  structures  on  the  world.  ...  where  the 
structure is different, the world is different. (ibid., p. 52) 
The world itself must be somehow lexicon-dependent. (ibid., p. 77) 
What is thus at stake is the notion of a mind-independent, or in Putnam’s terms, “ready-made” 
world. And for the reasons  given above, this term is for Kuhn nonsensical. Nevertheless, he 
5 A bit further in the same article, Kuhn compares his arguments against an absolute Archimedean platform and 
the correspondence theory of truth with the ones he is about to present: “This one, unlike the last, is not 
necessary or an a priori characteristic, but must be suggested by observations.” (Kuhn, 2000, p. 116). The 
comparison thus explicitly shows that Kuhn thought of these arguments as a priori and not based on empirical 
observations.
warns his readers that this does not imply that the world is somehow mind-dependent: “the 
metaphor of a mind-dependent world — like its cousin, the constructed or invented world — 
proves to be deeply misleading” (p. 103).
How should the notion of world be treated then?  Instead of the strict dichotomy between 
the  mind-independent  world  and our  representations  of  it, Kuhn proposes “a  sort  of  post-
Darwinian  Kantianism. Like  the  Kantian  categories, the  lexicon  supplies  preconditions  of 
possible  experience”  (p.  104).  And  as  the  lexical  categories  change  (ibid.),  both  in  a 
diachronous  and  a  synchronous  manner,  “the  world  ...  alters  with  time  and  from  one 
community to the next” (p. 102).  Kuhn compares a permanent, fixed, and stable foundation 
“underlying all these processes of differentiation and change” to “Kant’s Ding an sich”, which 
“is  ineffable,  undescribable,  undiscussable”  (p.  104).  And what  replaces  the  dichotomy of 
mind/language/thinking and the one big mind-independent world (p. 120) is the concept of 
“niche”: “the world is our representation of our niche” (p. 103). 
Those niches, which both create and are created by the conceptual and instrumental 
tools with which their inhabitants practice upon them, are as solid, real, resistant to 
arbitrary change as the external world was once said to be. (p. 120) 
Now, what has become of the notion of truth in Kuhn’s post-Darwinian Kantianism?6 Truth 
can at best be seen as having “only intra-theoretic applications” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 266): 
Evaluation of a statement’s truth values is, in short, an activity that can be conducted 
only with a lexicon already in place. (Kuhn, 2000, p. 77) 
By contrast, “[t]he ways of being-in-the-world which a lexicon provides are not candidates for 
true/false”  (p.  103-104).  None  of  these  “form[s]  of  life”,  “practice[s]-in-the-world”  give 
“privileged access to a real, as against an invented, world” (ibid., p. 104). Therefore the speech 
of theories becoming truer “has a vaguely ungrammatical ring: it is hard to know quite what 
those who use it have in mind.” (p. 115).7
Furthermore, if  with  Kuhn  the  sciences  form a “complex but  unsystematic  structure  of 
distinct specialties or species” and therefore have to be “viewed as plural” (p. 119), and if the 
niches “do not sum to a single coherent whole of which we and the practitioners of all the 
6 Kuukkanen is not the only one who skips over Kuhn’s arguments given in the tradition of Kantian philosophy. 
Brendan Larvor (cp. Larvor , 2003), for example, argues that “Kuhn worked into his model of science the 
historicism found in Koyre and Butterfield” (p. 386), so that his (Kuhn’s) claims “that there is no ahistorical 
standard of rationality by which past episodes may be judged and that science cannot be shown to be heading 
towards the Truth – [...] now appear as methodological commitments rather than historico-philosophical 
theses. Kuhn made waves by dropping an historicist stone into a scientific pond.” (ibid., p. 389). However, as 
our discussion shows, Kuhn’s views on these issues cannot be reduced to a mere application of the 
methodological standards, characteristic for the tradition of historicism in which he stood, to philosophy of 
science. 
7 Kuhn obviously emphasized his proximity to more “continentally minded” traditions in philosophy not just by 
his explicit “Kantianism”, but also by calling upon key notions such as Heidegger’s “being-in-the-world” or 
late Wittgenstein’s “forms of life”.
individual scientific specialties are inhabitants” (p. 120), then “there is no basis for talk of 
science’s gradual elimination of all worlds excepting the single real one.” (p. 86).
What these quotes show is that the problem with the correspondence theory is not only in 
the correspondence itself (as Kuukkanen takes it to be), but also in the notion of world that is 
supposed  to  participate  in  this  correspondence. But  what  would  it  mean  to  offer  a  valid 
argument against the correspondence theory of truth if not to show that one of its constitutive 
terms, together with the correspondence itself, is meaningless. Thus, when Kuukkanen claims 
that Kuhn’s argument against the correspondence theory is epistemological, this interpretation 
is  acceptable  only  if  epistemology is  taken in  view of  Kuhn’s transcendental perspective. 
Bearing this in mind, we have to reject Kuukkanen’s claim that Kuhn “failed to understand the 
nature of the correspondence theory as a non-epistemic theory”, for, as we have seen, such a 
non-epistemic character of the correspondence theory is for Kuhn plainly nonsensical. Once 
again: 
There is, I think, no theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases like ’really there’; 
the notion of a match between the ontology of a theory and its ‘real’ counterpart in 
nature now seems to me illusive in principle. Besides, as a historian, I am impressed 
with the implausibility of the view. (Kuhn, 1996, p. 206). 
We  have  thus  shown  that  Kuukkanen’s  arguments  against  Kuhn’s  rejection  of  the 
correspondence  theory  of  truth,  and  for  the  compatibility  of  the  Kuhnian  standpoint  with 
convergent  realism –  both  fail. Showing  that  Kuhn’s  position  can  be  incorporated  into 
coherentist  epistemology cannot  help in  bringing him closer  to  convergent  realism since a 
coherentist approach should either be compatible with Kuhn’s a priori  argument, or if it  is 
incompatible with it, then so much worse for Kuukkanen’s idea of incorporating Kuhn into 
coherentism.
5 Conclusion
J. M. Kuukkanen tried to show that by incorporating Kuhn into coherentist epistemology we 
can reject the claim that Kuhn’s philosophical standpoint abandons a rational inter-paradigm 
theory comparison, as well as the claim that it is incompatible with convergent realism. In this 
paper we have argued that there are certain problems with Kuukkanen’s arguments. On the one 
hand, we have shown that Kuhn’s views on theory comparison and theory choice allow only 
for,  what  we  have  called,  “the  very  weak  notion  of  rationality”,  and  that  Kuhn  can  be 
interpreted as a coherentist only in view of this notion. On the other hand, we have shown that  
Kuhn had an argument against convergent realism, which Kuukkanen did not take into account 
when claiming that Kuhn’s standpoint is compatible with it. In both cases Kuukkanen’s point 
faces the following problem: either coherentist epistemology claims the opposite of Kuhn, and 
is thus incompatible with  Kuhn's ideas, or it is compatible with Kuhn’s ideas, in which case 
this link offers no new and/or surprising insights into Kuhn’s philosophical standpoint, with 
respect to the  issues  discussed.8 We would like to conclude with two remarks regarding our 
arguments.
With respect to the rationality of Kuhnian inter-paradigm theory comparison, it is important 
to notice that our distinction  between three notions of rationality, though not very  refined, is 
sufficient for our point. That is to say, the distinction is not meant to serve discussions on the 
issue of rationality in general, since it can indeed be further refined. However, the fact that it is 
exhaustive is sufficient for our claim that Kuhn’s position cannot belong to either of the first 
two categories.
With regard to Kuhn’s a priori argument against the correspondence theory of truth and 
convergent realism, we would like to remark that in order to challenge Kuukkanen’s claim that 
Kuhn’s  argument  against  convergent  realism was ultimately  empirical, it  was  sufficient  to 
show that Kuhn, in fact, had an a priori argument. The question as to whether Kuhn’s argument 
is a good one, or whether it is a novel one (or only based on arguments that were already given 
in the continental philosophical tradition) is irrelevant for our point.
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